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ABSTRACT
To empirically investigate conceptual modeling languages,
subjects are typically confronted with experimental tasks,
such as the creation, modification or understanding of con-
ceptual models. Thereby, accuracy, i.e., the amount of cor-
rectly performed tasks divided by the number of total tasks,
is usually used to assess performance. Even though accuracy
is widely adopted, it is connected to two often overlooked
problems. First, accuracy is a rather insensitive measure.
Second, for tasks of low complexity, the measurement of ac-
curacy may be distorted by peculiarities of the human mind.
In order to tackle these problems, we propose to additionally
assess the subject’s mental effort, i.e., the mental resources
required to perform a task. In particular, we show how afore-
mentioned problems connected to accuracy can be resolved,
that mental effort is a valid measure of performance and how
mental effort can easily be assessed in empirical research.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
G.3 [Probability and Statistics]: Experimental design
General Terms
Experimentation, Human Factors, Measurement
1. INTRODUCTION
Over the years, numerous conceptual modeling languages
and associated modeling tools have been proposed [15]. In
order to allow for an objective discrimination whether new
∗This research is supported by Austrian Science Fund
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proposals come along with improvements, the adoption of
empirical software engineering has been advocated [4, 26].
Certainly, empirical research has been shown to be suitable
for putting discussions on an objective basis. Still, in or-
der to contribute to truly objective results, a valid exper-
imental setup, as well as valid measurement methods are
indispensable—slightest changes in the design might lead to
fundamentally different outcomes [12].
In this work, we focus on empirical research that involves
human activities, such as the creation, modification and un-
derstanding of conceptual models. Therein, various meth-
ods have been applied to identify differences. In particu-
lar, researchers have used modeling tasks [20], modification
tasks [7] and sets of questions [5] to assess performance of
conceptual modeling languages. In order to measure the
outcome of tasks, typically accuracy and duration are ana-
lyzed (cf. [5, 7, 11, 20, 28]). Accuracy thereby refers to the
percentage of correctly performed tasks, whereas duration
refers to how long a subject required to perform a task. Even
though accuracy is well-established and widely adopted, it
is connected to two often overlooked problems. First, in or-
der to identify differences with respect to accuracy, subjects
need to commit errors. Hence, subtle differences that may
be relevant, but do not lead to errors, cannot be identified
(e.g., slight improvement of comprehensibility). Second, it
has been shown that for tasks that are easy, humans tend
to make mistakes that are actually not caused by the mod-
eling notation, but are rather the result of peculiarities of
the human mind [10]. In order to overcome these problems
and to improve validity of the collected data, we propose to
additionally assess the subject’s mental effort, i.e., the men-
tal resources required for performing the task. We would
like to stress that we do not propose replacing accuracy and
duration, but rather using mental effort as an additional
perspective that potentially provides further insights. The
contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we argue for
measuring mental effort on the basis of literature. Second,
we will substantiate our claims with experiences drawn from
own experiments.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion 2 discusses problems related to accuracy and how to
address them using mental effort. Insights from experiments
making use of mental effort are presented in Section 3 and
afterwards discussed in Section 4. Section 5 presents related
work and Section 6 concludes with a summary.
2. MEASURING MENTAL EFFORT
In the following we start by discussing the previously de-
scribed problems in more detail. Then, we introduce mental
effort to address the aforementioned problems.
Problems Concerning Accuracy. In the introduction,
we briefly mentioned that accuracy is of rather low sensi-
tivity and potentially incorrect for tasks of low complexity.
Issues regarding the sensitivity become clear when looking
at the definition of accuracy. Usually, accuracy is defined to
be the ratio of correctly performed tasks (e.g., correct an-
swers) divided by the number of all performed tasks (e.g.,
total amount of questions). In other words, subjects have
to commit mistakes in order to obtain a lower accuracy. If
a task performed in the course of an experiment is not diffi-
cult enough to provoke errors, no differences can be observed
with respect to accuracy, also known as ceiling effect [25].
Likewise, if differences between experimental tasks are not
large enough, no differences can be observed.
In addition, for tasks of low complexity a further problem
arises—it has been recognized that for such tasks subjects
tend to commit more careless mistakes. In [10], this phe-
nomenon is explained by Dual-Process Theory [22]. Roughly
speaking, this theory postulates that the human brain con-
sists of two systems, S1 and S2. S1 processes are character-
ized as being fast, unconscious and effortless. S2 processes,
in contrast, are slow, conscious and effortful. In addition,
S2 serves as monitor of the fast automatic responses of S1.
Apparently, in certain situations, S1 comes up with a fast
response and S2 does not intervene—leading to answers that
are fast but incorrect. Hence, for tasks of low complexity,
it may be the case that accuracy does not reflect the task’s
difficulty, but rather this peculiarity of the human mind.
Up to now we have discussed problems associated with mea-
suring accuracy, i.e., low sensitivity and potential problems
when assessing accuracy for tasks of low complexity. In the
following, we introduce the concept of mental effort and il-
lustrate how it can be used to overcome these problems.
Measuring Mental Effort. In general, the human brain
can be seen as a “truly generic problem solver” [24]. Within
the human brain, cognitive psychology differentiates between
working memory that contains information currently being
processed, as well as long-term memory in which informa-
tion can be stored for a long period of time [17]. Most se-
vere, and thus of high interest, are limitations of the working
memory. As reported in [2], working memory cannot hold
more than about seven items at the same time. The amount
of working memory currently used is thereby referred to as
mental effort. The importance of the working memory has
been recognized and led to the development and establish-
ment of Cognitive Load Theory, meanwhile widespread and
empirically validated in numerous studies [3].
To measure mental effort, various techniques, such as rat-
ing scales, pupillary responses or heart-rate variability are
available [17]. Especially rating scales, i.e., self-rating men-
tal effort, has been shown to reliably measure mental effort
and is thus widely adopted [9, 17]. Furthermore, this kind
of measurement can easily be applied, e.g., by using 7-point
rating scales. For instance, in [13] mental effort was assessed
using a 7-point rating scale, ranging from (1) very easy to
(7) very hard for the question“How difficult was it for you to
learn about lightning from the presentation you just saw?”.
In the context of conceptual models, mental effort is of in-
terest as it appears to be connected to performance, e.g.,
properly answering questions about a model. In general, it
is known that errors are more likely to occur when the work-
ing memory’s limits are exceeded [23]. Similarly, in [14] it
is argued that higher mental effort is in general associated
with lower understanding of models.
Based on these insights, we argue that mental effort is con-
nected to performance, i.e., accuracy and duration. In con-
trast to accuracy, however, subtle differences can presum-
ably be observed. In particular, for cases where mental ef-
fort is well within the working memory’s limits and thus does
not provoke a significant amount of errors, still a different
mental effort could be observed. In addition, for tasks of low
complexity, careless mistakes may distort the measurement
of accuracy. For mental effort, however, it can be expected
that careless mistakes will not distort the measurement.
3. MENTAL EFFORT IN EMPIRICAL RE-
SEARCH
So far, our arguments for measuring mental effort are based
on insights from literature. In the following, we will com-
plement the discussion with findings we gained in own ex-
periments. For each experiment, we will shortly sketch the
setup on a very abstract level and point out relevant findings
related to the measurement of mental effort.
3.1 Experiment 1: Test Cases in Declarative
Business Process Modeling
Background. In this experiment, we investigated whether
the presence of test cases supports the maintenance of declar-
ative business process models, as argued in [32]. In the con-
text of this work, the relevant information is that subjects
were asked to adapt conceptual models with different types
of operational support.
Setup. We employed a randomized, balanced single-factor
experiment with repeated measurements (cf. [27]). The fac-
tor was adoption of test cases, having factor levels test cases
as well as absence of test cases. The experiment’s objects
were change assignments for two declarative process mod-
els. Measured response variables relevant for this work were
mental effort and accuracy, i.e., the amount of errors con-
ducted (details are provided in [31]). To assess mental effort,
we employed a 7-point rating scale, ranging from Extremely
low mental effort (1) to Extremely high mental effort (7) for
the question “How would you assess the mental effort for
completing the change tasks (with tests)?”. For assessing the
impact of factor level absence of test cases, the phrase “with
tests” was replaced by “without tests”.
Execution of Experiment. The experiment was con-
ducted in December 2010 in a course on business process
management at the University of Innsbruck; in total 12
students participated. Operational support for collecting
demographic data was provided by Cheetah Experimental
Platform (CEP) [21], modeling assignments were conducted
using Test Driven Modeling Suite (TDMS) [30].
Findings Relevant to Mental Effort. The collected data
indicated that subjects, who had test cases at hand, con-
ducted fewer errors, however, the differences were not signif-
icant (Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test, Z = -0.857, p = 0.391).
Interestingly, the data indicated a lower mental effort for
subjects who had test cases at hand. However, in this case
the differences could be found to be significant (Wilcoxon
Signed-Rank Test, Z = -2.565, p = 0.010). A detailed anal-
ysis showed that the provided models were too simple to
provoke the desired effects, i.e., differences with respect to
the amount of errors committed. In fact, 96% of the tasks
were performed correctly, leaving almost no room for im-
provement. Still, the models were difficult enough to achieve
significant results with respect to mental effort. Knowing
that errors are more likely to occur when the working mem-
ory’s limits are exceeded [23], these results seem plausible.
Even though the tasks were not difficult enough to go beyond
the limit of the subjects’ working memory and thereby pro-
voking errors, different levels of mental effort were required.
Put differently, it appears as if in this case measuring mental
effort provided a more sensitive method than accuracy.
3.2 Experiment 2: Test Cases in Declarative
Business Process Modeling (Replication)
Background. In this experiment, we further explored this
research direction, i.e., the background is identical to Ex-
periment 1.
Setup. Since this experiment is a replication of Experiment
1, the setup is identical, except for more complex models1.
Execution of Experiment. The experiment was con-
ducted in December 2011 in a course on business process
management at the University of Ulm; in total 31 students
participated. Again, CEP [21] and TDMS [30] were used as
operational support.
Findings Relevant to Mental Effort. Data analysis
showed that subjects who had test cases at hand conducted
significantly less errors (Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test, Z =
-3.165, p = 0.002) and required significantly less mental ef-
fort (Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test, Z = -3.867, p = 0.000).
Interestingly, the total amount of correctly performed tasks
dropped from 96% in Experiment 1 to 80% in this experi-
ment. Hence, the two key observations are, as follows. First,
apparently a certain level of complexity was required to pro-
voke enough errors and to make differences with respect
to accuracy significant. Second, mental effort consistently
showed significant differences in both experiments. In other
words, as discussed in Section 2, mental effort and accuracy
seem connected, however, a certain level of complexity is re-
quired for accuracy in order to show significant differences.
1Material can be downloaded from:
http://bpm.q-e.at/experiment/TDMReplication
3.3 Experiment 3: Hierarchy in Business Pro-
cess Models
Background. In this experiment we investigated the im-
pact of hierarchy on the understandability of BPMN models.
In the context of this work, the essential part is that we elab-
orated pairs of information-equivalent models, one of them
making use of hierarchy. Then, we asked subjects to an-
swer questions about those models, measuring accuracy of
answers, duration and mental effort.
Setup. We employed a randomized, balanced single-factor
experiment with repeated measurements (cf. [27]). The fac-
tor was hierarchy with factor levels flat as well as hierarchi-
cal. The experiment’s objects were two BPMN-based busi-
ness processes. Measured response variables relevant for this
work were accuracy of answers, duration and mental effort2.
In contrast to Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, where men-
tal effort was assessed once for each subject, in this exper-
iment we measured the expended mental effort after each
question. To assess mental effort, we used a 7-point rating
scale ranging from Extremely low mental effort (1) to Ex-
tremely high mental effort (7). The question for measuring
mental effort was: “Please indicate your mental effort for
answering this question (question X)”.
Execution of Experiment. The experiment was con-
ducted in a course on business process management at the
University of Eindhoven in January 2012; in total 114 stu-
dents participated. Again, CEP [21] was used for presenting
the models to subjects and collecting answers.
Findings Relevant to Mental Effort. The assessment
of accuracy, duration and mental effort per question, as op-
posed to Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, where mental
effort was assessed once for the entire experiment, allowed
for a much more fine grained analysis. In the course of this
experiment, 2 BPMN-based business process models were
presented to each subject. For each model, 8 questions were
asked, leading a total of 16 questions per subject. Since we
expected different mental effort, accuracy and duration, de-
pending on whether a question was posed for a hierarchical
model or a flat model, responses were analyzed separately,
leading to a total of 32 data points. In the following, we
will discuss this data from two perspectives. First, we will
present a case in which accuracy did not reflect the diffi-
culty of a task, but rather peculiarities of the human mind.
Second, we will take a closer look into the relation between
mental effort, accuracy and duration.
Accuracy for Tasks of Low Complexity. In Section 2
we argued that measurement of accuracy might lead to un-
expected results—in the following, we provide further em-
pirical evidence. In particular, the third question in this
experiment yielded an average mental effort of 3.14, ac-
curacy of 0.79 and duration of 40 seconds when asked for
the hierarchical model. If the same question was posed for
the information-equivalent model without hierarchy, men-
tal effort increased to 3.75, duration increased to 51 sec-
onds, but also the accuracy increased to 0.91. Statistically
speaking, a Mann-Whitney U test showed that mental ef-
2Material can be downloaded from:
http://bpm.q-e.at/experiment/Hierarchy
fort increased significantly (z = -3.271, p = 0.001), also the
duration increased significantly (z = -4.468, p = 0.000). Ap-
parently inconsistently, also the average accuracy increased,
even though not significantly (z = -1.717, p = 0.086)—
according to previous findings, higher mental effort should
have been associated with lower accuracy.
In order to resolve this contradiction, we investigated the
aforementioned question in detail. The analysis showed that
it should have been harder to answer the question for the
non-hierarchical model, i.e., lower accuracy could be ex-
pected. In particular, for answering the question in the
hierarchical model, 13 BPMN nodes had to be taken into
account—for the non-hierarchical model, however, 92 nodes
had to be considered3. Knowing that this amount of nodes
required the subjects to scroll considerably to see all rel-
evant model elements, it seems surprising that actually a
higher accuracy could be observed. However, in the light of
Dual-Process Theory [22], these results can be explained as
follows. For the hierarchical model, the question could be
answered easily, as indicated by the average mental effort
of 3.14 (approximately Low mental effort). Hence, it seems
plausible that system S1 provided a quick, but incorrect an-
swer that was not overridden by S2. In the non-hierarchical
model, subjects were forced to scroll to determine the an-
swer, i.e., involving conscious activities, hence activating S2.
The activation of S2, in turn, ensured that the question was
answered in a controlled way, instead by a quick response of
S1. Summarizing, it seems as if relying on accuracy would
have been misleading in this case, while mental effort and
duration provided more reliable results.
Validity of Mental Effort. So far we have provided em-
pirical evidence that mental effort is more sensitive than
accuracy and can be measured properly for tasks of low com-
plexity. In the following, we will provide empirical evidence
that mental effort is tightly connected to accuracy and du-
ration, i.e., is a valid measure of performance. To visualize
the interplay between mental effort and accuracy, we used
a scatter plot (cf. Figure 1). Therein, the x-axis represents
the average mental effort required for answering a question.
Values from 1 to 7 represent the rating scale used for assess-
ing mental effort, ranging from Extremely low mental effort
(1) to Extremely high mental effort (7). Likewise, the y-
axis reflects a question’s average accuracy, i.e., the ratio of
correct answers to total answers given for a question. As
discussed in Section 2, higher mental effort should be as-
sociated with lower performance. Hence, in this particular
case, higher mental effort should be associated with lower
accuracy. In fact, in Figure 1, a tendency toward lower ac-
curacy with increased mental effort can be observed. In par-
ticular, the dashed line represents the regression line as ob-
tained through simple linear regression (R2 = 0.41, F(1,30)
= 21.16, p = 0.000). Please note that this regression does
not contradict the case when mental effort and accuracy
do not perfectly correlate, as demonstrated in the example
above. Rather, the regression is not perfect, hence leaving
room for such idiosyncrasies.
Akin to Figure 1, in Figure 2, the interplay between men-
tal effort and duration is illustrated. Likewise, the x-axis
3The models and question can be accessed through:
http://bpm.q-e.at/misc/HierarchyQuestion3
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Figure 1: Mental effort versus accuracy
represents mental effort. On the y-axis, the average amount
of seconds required for answering a question can be found.
The dashed line is the result of simple linear regression (R2
= 0.55, F(1,30) = 36.70, p = 0.000). Interestingly, in this
case higher mental effort is associated with higher duration.
In the light of the background presented in Section 2, also
this result seems plausible. The more difficult a questions
is to answer, the longer the answering process will take and
the higher the mental effort will be.
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Figure 2: Mental effort versus duration (sec)
To substantiate these observations, we computed Pearson
Correlation coefficient for correlations between mental ef-
fort, accuracy and duration. As shown in Table 1, the find-
ings coincide with the observations made in Figures 1 and 2.
In particular, the results confirm that mental effort and ac-
curacy are correlated negatively (r(30) = -0.643, p = 0.000);
mental effort and duration are correlated positively (r(30)
= 0.742, p = 0.000). Finally, accuracy and duration are
correlated negatively (r(30) = -0.459, p = 0.008).
Mental Eff. Duration
Accuracy Pearson Corr. -0.643** -0.459**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.008
N 32 32
Mental Eff. Pearson Corr. 0.742**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000
N 32
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Table 1: Correlations
4. DISCUSSION
Up to know we argued that accuracy is presumably rather
insensitive and may be distorted for tasks of low complex-
ity. In order to tackle these problems, the measurement of
mental effort was proposed. In the following, key insights as
well as limitations of this approach are discussed.
Regarding sensitivity, Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 pro-
vided empirical evidence that mental effort is more sensi-
tive than accuracy. In Experiment 1 tasks of rather low
complexity were provided to the subjects. Even though dif-
ferences with respect to accuracy and mental effort could
be observed, only mental effort differed significantly [31].
In Experiment 2 the task complexity was increased, conse-
quently more errors were committed. Knowing that errors
are more likely to be committed when the working mem-
ory is overloaded [23], these observations seem plausible. In
Experiment 1, different levels of mental effort could be ob-
served. However, the working memory was not overloaded,
resulting in a low error rate and hence marginally fluctua-
tions in accuracy. In Experiment 2, increased complexity
lead to an overload of working memory, accordingly the er-
ror rate increased and accuracy dropped. In other words,
it seems likely that differences with respect to mental effort
can be observed before differences with respect to accuracy
occur, i.e., mental effort appears to be more sensitive.
Regarding tasks of low complexity, Experiment 3 provided
further insights. In particular, we could observe an increase
of mental effort and duration that was connected to in-
creased accuracy—actually a decrease of accuracy could be
expected, as far more model elements had to be taken into
account. As indicated in [10], it seems as if this result can be
traced back to peculiarities of the human mind, which tends
to commit more careless mistakes for tasks of low complex-
ity. Hence, in such a case it seems as if the measurement
of mental effort provides a more accurate picture. Please
note that this finding does not contradict the correlation
between mental effort and accuracy, as found in Experiment
3. Rather, the correlation is valid in general, while this pe-
culiar interplay could be found for one specific question.
Apparently, several limitations apply to this work. First,
as shown in Figure 2, a linear relationship between men-
tal effort and duration could be found. Even though this
seems plausible for short-lasting tasks (the maximum aver-
age duration was about 90 seconds), it seems questionable
in how far this holds for longer tasks. For instance, a long-
lasting repetitive task, such as finding all elements named
“A” within a model, will most likely lead to a low mental
effort, but a long duration. Second, mental effort is a sub-
jective measure. Even though it has been shown that people
are able to give a numerical indication of their mental bur-
den [16], it is questionable whether mental effort of different
subjects can be compared directly. Hence, it seems advis-
able to ensure a reasonable sample size when conducting
between-subject experiments or to focus on within-subject
experiments. Third, we reported from consistent results
across three experiments. Still, our findings may be pecu-
liarities of these experiments. To improve the generalization,
more experiments adopting different modeling languages are
required.
5. RELATEDWORK
In the domain of cognitive psychology, the work of Paas et
al., in which mental effort is discussed broadly, is directly
connected [17]. In contrast to this work, however, mental
effort is not linked to conceptual modeling. In the domain
of conceptual modeling, related work can be found where
model understandability is of concern. For instance, Aranda
et al. provide guidelines for assessing model understandabil-
ity [1]. Besides accuracy and duration, perceived difficulty is
proposed to be measured. However, in contrast to this work,
no indications on how perceived difficulty can be measured,
are given. Likewise, [11] assesses in a survey how under-
standability of models is measured. The most prominent
measure is accuracy, followed by duration and perceived ease
of understanding. However, these studies rather rely on the
ease-of-use scale from Technology Acceptance Model [6] than
on rating scales for measuring mental effort. Recently, men-
tal effort has also been used as a tool for discussing model
understandability. For instance, in [29] the role of mental
effort in Business Process Modeling is discussed. Likewise,
in [28, 33] mental effort is employed for assessing the impact
of hierarchy on model understandability. In contrast to this
work, however, mental effort is rather used as a tool for dis-
cussion; the measurement of mental effort is not of concern.
Apparently, measuring mental effort is only meaningful if
the validity of the experimental design can be ensured. In
this respect [8, 18] provide guidelines for the proper opera-
tionalization of measurements.
6. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
In this work, we showed how measuring mental effort allows
to compensate for shortcomings when measuring accuracy.
In particular, we argued that mental effort is more sensitive
than accuracy and that the measurement is not distorted for
tasks of low complexity. Hence, it allows to identify subtle
differences between conceptual models or conceptual mod-
eling languages. Likewise, when data regarding accuracy
is affected by ceiling effects, mental effort can still provide
valuable insights. In addition, we showed that the measure-
ment of mental effort can be implemented easily through
the adoption of rating scales. Thereby, we recommend to
measure mental effort after each task in order to provide a
fine-grained measurement. With this contribution we hope
to help in paving avenues for even more comprehensive em-
pirical investigations.
Future work will imply the collection of further data for a
deeper investigation of the interplay between mental effort,
accuracy and duration. In particular, we plan to adopt eye
movement analysis [19] to constantly monitor mental effort
while subjects perform a task.
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